计算机科学 ›› 2017, Vol. 44 ›› Issue (5): 153-159.doi: 10.11896/j.issn.1002-137X.2017.05.027
巩绪福,蔚承建,钱震,车宝真,沈航
GONG Xu-fu, WEI Cheng-jian, QIAN Zhen, CHE Bao-zhen and SHEN Hang
摘要： 近年来,安全问题在全世界范围内得到了越来越多的重视,如何利用有限的安全资源最大限度地部署防御策略保护重要的设施以及目标是许多安全部门所面临的一项艰巨的挑战。针对海事安全巡逻问题,提出基于Stackelberg博弈的安全模型进行安全资源调度,在安全资源有限的情况下,对现实世界中出现的时空限制和人类行为不完全理性因素进行了综合考虑,放宽了经典安全博弈模型对攻击者是完美理性这一假设。在随机最优反应均衡理论的基础上考虑了攻击者的行为偏好,对非完全理性情况下的最佳策略和完全理性情况下的最佳策略进行对比和分析,实验结果表明,非完全理性下的新模型在现实问题中可以获得更高的收益,可更有效地用于海事安全巡逻问题。
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