计算机科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 48 ›› Issue (3): 144-150.doi: 10.11896/jsjkx.201100056

• 数据库&大数据&数据科学 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于演化博弈的数据收益权分配机制设计

商希雪1, 韩海庭2, 朱郑州3   

  1. 1 中国政法大学刑事司法学院 北京100088
    2 哥本哈根大学食品与资源经济学院 哥本哈根1958
    3 北京大学软件与微电子学院 北京100871
  • 收稿日期:2020-11-06 修回日期:2020-11-30 出版日期:2021-03-15 发布日期:2021-03-05
  • 通讯作者: 韩海庭(hanht@pku.edu.cn)
  • 作者简介:shangxixue@126.com
  • 基金资助:
    嘉士伯基金(CF18-1112);中国政法大学科研创新年度青年项目(20ZFQ82007)

Mechanism Design of Right to Earnings of Data Utilization Based on Evolutionary Game Model

SHANG Xi-xue1, HAN Hai-ting2, ZHU Zheng-zhou3   

  1. 1 School of Criminal Justice,China University of Political Science and Law,Beijing 100088,China
    2 Department of Food and Resource Economics,University of Copenhagen,Copenhagen 1958,Denmark
    3 School of Software and Microelectronic,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China
  • Received:2020-11-06 Revised:2020-11-30 Online:2021-03-15 Published:2021-03-05
  • About author:SHANG Xi-xue,born in 1987,Ph.D,assistant professor.Her main research interests include legal protection for personal data,regulation approach to digi-tal economy.
    HAN Hai-ting,born in 1993,Ph.D,is a member of China Computer Federation.His main research interests include economic design,computational sociology,data governance and data market infrastructures based on DLT and smart contracts.
  • Supported by:
    Carlsberg Foundation (CF18-1112) and China University of Political Science and Law Annual Project of Scientific Research and Innovation for Young Scholar(20ZFQ82007).

摘要: 针对数据要素市场化过程中面临的数据难以完全交割、数据产权公平划分困难、个人与企业博弈中企业占优等问题,文中首先提出了数据收益权概念,以摆脱传统产权概念的束缚,进而使数据交易制度更好地适应数据市场的一般特点;然后引用经济学的演化博弈分析,将数据收益的直接分配问题转化为理性的个人和企业相互试错,发掘不同条件下的趋近于收敛的群体优势策略,实现了分配的公平性和“卡尔多-希克斯效率”;最后引入法学中权利权衡的比例原则,使司法审判可计算、可编程、可调控。算法分析和仿真实验证明,在现实条件下,该博弈框架能良好地实现市场均衡,并发现不同Wij条件下均衡的收敛特征和收敛速度,为司法实践提供了重要的量化分析工具,是计算法学的重要实践。

关键词: 阿列克西, 比例原则, 机制设计, 计算法学, 数据收益权, 演化博弈

Abstract: In order to solve the problemsin the process of marketization of data elements,such as the difficulty of complete deli-very of data,the difficulty of fair division of data property rights,and thesuperiority of enterprises in the game between indivi-duals and enterprises,this paper proposes the concept of data utilization to get rid of the restriction of traditional property rights concept,andmakes the trading system better adapt to the general characteristics ofthe data market.At the same time,the evolutionary game analysis of economics is used to transform the direct distribution of data revenue into rational individual and enterprise mutual trial and error,and to explore the group advantage strategies that tend to converge under different conditions,so as to realize the fairness of distribution and the “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency”.Finally,the weight formula of the proportionality principle injustice is introduced to make the judicial trial computable,programmable and controllable.Algorithm analysis and si-mulation experiments prove that the game framework can well realize market equilibrium under realistic conditions,and find the convergence characteristics and convergence speeds under different Wij conditions,providing an important quantitative analysis tool for judicial practice.

Key words: Computational law, Evolution game, Mechanism design, Proportionality principle, Robert alexy, Usufruct of data exploitation

中图分类号: 

  • TP301.6
[1]WING J M.Computational thinking[J].Communications of the ACM,2006,49(3):33-35.
[2]LOEVINGERL.Jurimetrics--The Next Step Forward[J].Minn.L.Rev.,1948,33:455.
[3]SEIPEL P.Computing law:perspectives on a new legal discipline[D].Stockholm:LiberFörlag,1977.
[4]LOVE N,GENESERETH M.Computational law[C]//Procee-dings of the 10th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law.2005:205-209.
[5]HAN H H,YUAN L L.Study on Data Capitalization in the Digi-tal Economy [J].Credit Reference,2019,37(4):72-78.
[6]YE Y Z,LIU G H,ZHU Y Y.Two-step Authorization Pattern of Data Product Circulation[J].Computer Science,2021,48(1):119-124.
[7]WEIBULL J W.Evolutionary game theory[M].MIT Press,1997.
[8]WANG Y Z,YU J Y,QU W,et al.Evolutionary game model and analysis methods for network group behavior[J].Chinese Journal of Computers,2015,38(2):282-300.
[9]TANG D Z,MA W F.Research on Compensation System of Urban House RemovalBased on Evolutionary Game Theory[J].Finance and Trade Research,2007(6):25-28,66.
[10]LI C F,ZHANG L Y.Interest Conflict of River Basin Ecological Compensation Based on Evolutionary Game Theory[J].China Population Resource and Environment,2014,24(1):171-176.
[11]XING H L,GAO C Y.Research on Dynamic Evolutionary Game Model of Data Resource Sharing among Big Data Alliance Members:Based on the Perspective of Sharing Positivity[J].Management Review,2020,32(8):155-165.
[12]TU S B.Research on the possibility and Limit of Mathematical Expression in Law:Based on economics and Proportionality Principle [J].Law Review,2020(4):37-50.
[13]LI G Q.Conceptualization of Ownership:A Historical Character of Ownership in Modern Private Law [J].Modern Law Science,2009(4):20-28.
[14]KERBER W.A new (intellectual) property right for non-personal data? An economic analysis[J].Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht,Internationaler Teil (GRUR Int),2016,11:989-999.
[15]CAO J F,ZHU L H.Preliminary Study on European Data Pro-perty Rights [J].Information Security and Communications Privacy,2018(7):30-38.
[16]WILKINS R G.Defining the reasonable expectation of privacy:an emerging tripartite analysis[J].Vand.L.Rev.,1987,40:1077.
[17]KITCH E W.KATZ V.United States:The Limits of the Fourth Amendment[J].The Supreme Court Review,1968,1968:133-152.
[18]ZHU J J.The legal enlightenment of the country’s first big data product unfair competition dispute[N].People’s Court News,2018-09-26 (007).
[19]HANG X B.‘General Free Mode + Specific Payment Mode’:A New Thinking on Personal Information Protection [J].Journal of Comparative Law,2018(5):1-15.
[20]PENG C X.From legal Principle to Case Norm — Civil Law Application of Alexi Principle Theory [J].Chinese Journal of Law,2014 (4):92-113.
[21]ALEXY R.Institutionalized reason:the jurisprudence of Robert Alexy[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2012.
[22]STRINGHAME P.Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and the problem of central planning[J].Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics,2001,4(2):41-50.
[1] 王显芳, 张亮, 张宁.
基于前景理论的微信健康信息质量三方博弈分析
Evolutionary Game Analysis of WeChat Health Information Quality Optimization Based on Prospect Theory
计算机科学, 2022, 49(6A): 694-704. https://doi.org/10.11896/jsjkx.210900186
[2] 杜辉, 李卓, 陈昕.
基于在线双边拍卖的分层联邦学习激励机制
Incentive Mechanism for Hierarchical Federated Learning Based on Online Double Auction
计算机科学, 2022, 49(3): 23-30. https://doi.org/10.11896/jsjkx.210800051
[3] 杨昕宇, 彭长根, 杨辉, 丁红发.
基于演化博弈的理性拜占庭容错共识算法
Rational PBFT Consensus Algorithm with Evolutionary Game
计算机科学, 2022, 49(3): 360-370. https://doi.org/10.11896/jsjkx.210900110
[4] 王乐,毛剑琳,诸浩富,郭宁.
基于演化博弈论的p-坚持CSMA网络接入控制研究
Evolutionary Game Theory-based Access Control Study for P-persistent CSMA Networks
计算机科学, 2016, 43(9): 146-151. https://doi.org/10.11896/j.issn.1002-137X.2016.09.028
[5] .
机制设计理论及其在计算机网络协议设计中的应用研究

计算机科学, 2007, 34(3): 44-49.
Viewed
Full text


Abstract

Cited

  Shared   
  Discussed   
No Suggested Reading articles found!