Computer Science ›› 2021, Vol. 48 ›› Issue (1): 217-225.doi: 10.11896/jsjkx.200600013
• Artificial Intelligence • Previous Articles Next Articles
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| [1] | ZHANG Nan, CHEN Rong and GUO Shi-kai. State-of-the-art and Future of Voting Theory [J]. Computer Science, 2015, 42(5): 1-9. |
| [2] | . [J]. Computer Science, 2008, 35(1): 160-163. |
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