Abstract: In recent years,the security problem is becoming more and more popular all over the world.How to use the limited security resources to maximize the deployment of defensive strategies to protect critical facilities and goals is a critical challenge that a lot of security department have to face.For maritime safety patrol,security model based on Stackelberg game was proposed to carry out the security resource scheduling.In the case of limited security resources,the constraints of time and space appear in real world and factors that human behavior are not completely rational were comprehensive considered,and the security game’s assumption that attack is rational perfectly was relaxed.Based on the theory of quantal response equilibrium,the attacker’s behavior preference was considered,then the optimal strategy under the condition of imperfect rationality and the optimal strategy under the condition of complete rationality were compared and analyzed.Experimental results show that the new model under the condition of imperfect rationality can get higher returns in real-world problems,and can be more effectively used in maritime security patrol.

Key words: Security resource allocation,Human behavior model,Maritime security patrols,Stackelberg game