计算机科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 51 ›› Issue (6A): 230800134-7.doi: 10.11896/jsjkx.230800134

• 交叉&应用 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑供应商损失规避性和资金约束的供应链决策

李莉英, 周俊, 汪敏   

  1. 重庆交通大学数学与统计学院 重庆 400074
  • 发布日期:2024-06-06
  • 通讯作者: 周俊(zhoujun023@163.com)
  • 作者简介:(llying-111@163.com)
  • 基金资助:
    重庆市研究生联合培养基地建设项目(JDLHPYJD2021016);重庆市高校创新研究群体项目(CXQT21021)

Supply Chain Decisions Considering Supplier Loss Aversion and Financial Constraints

LI Liying, ZHOU Jun, WANG Min   

  1. College of Mathematics and Statistics,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China
  • Published:2024-06-06
  • About author:LI Liying,born in 1975,Ph.D,associate professor.Her main research interests include logistics and supply chain ma-nagement and so on.
    ZHOU Jun,born in 1992,postgraduate.His main research interests include logistics and supply chain management and so on.
  • Supported by:
    Joint Training Base Construction Project for Graduate Students in Chongqing(JDLHPYJD2021016) and Group Building Scientific Innovation Project for Universities in Chongqing(CXQT21021).

摘要: 随着市场竞争日益激烈,在产出不确定的情况下,供应商资金不足尤为常见。基于此,构建了一个以风险中性制造商为领导者,以损失规避供应商为跟随者的Stackelberg博弈模型。在银行融资和制造商预付款融资两种模式下,分别给出了损失规避供应商的最优生产投入量决策和制造商的最优损失分担决策。通过理论和算例分析表明:当各参数在一定范围内取不同值时,供应商和制造商可能倾向于选择不同的融资模式;在预付款融资模式下,供应商为最大化损失规避,将采取更加保守的生产策略,此时,制造商会通过承担更多的损失分担比例来激励供应商增加生产投入量。

关键词: 产出不确定, 损失规避, 资金约束, 融资策略, 损失分担

Abstract: With increasingly competitive markets,it is particularly common for suppliers to be underfunded in the presence of yield uncertainty.Based on this,a Stackelberg game model is constructed with the lead of risk-neutral manufacturer and the follower of loss-averse supplier.The optimal production input quantity decision of the loss-averse supplier and the optimal loss-sharing decision of the manufacturer are given under the two modes of bank financing and manufacturer’s advance payment financing,respectively.The theoretical and numerical analyses show that,when each parameter takes different values within a certain range,the supplier and the manufacturer may tend to choose different financing modes;in the advance payment financing mode,the more loss-averse the supplier is,the more conservative production strategy she will adopt,and then the manufacturer will incentivize the supplier to increase the amount of production inputs by assuming more loss-sharing ratios.

Key words: Output uncertainty, Loss aversion, Capital-constraint, Financing strategies, Loss sharing

中图分类号: 

  • F274
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