计算机科学 ›› 2016, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (Z6): 568-570.doi: 10.11896/j.issn.1002-137X.2016.6A.136
王晓,李继红
WANG Xiao and LI Ji-hong
摘要： 在休假排队服务系统中引入了附加时间效应,从顾客决策角度得到了个体均衡和社会最优两种情形下的顾客均衡进入概率,并对比了两种概率的关系,结果说明服务系统中只关注个人利益往往会造成机构更大的拥塞,影响整体社会效益。为使个体利益和社会最优平衡,从事前(服务前)收费的角度获得了顾客的固定进入费用,并基于事后(服务后)收费的原则提出了3种可变进入费用,以保证机构以不同的方式合理定价收费。
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