计算机科学

计算机科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 49 ›› Issue (11A): 210900104-6.doi: 10.11896/jsjkx.210900104

• 交叉&应用 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑风险规避和资金约束的低碳供应链决策研究

李莉英, 刘光安, 李小兵, 王博   

  1. 重庆交通大学数学与统计学院 重庆 400074
  • 出版日期:2022-11-10 发布日期:2022-11-21
  • 通讯作者: 刘光安(lga120207@163.com)
  • 作者简介:(llying-111@163.com)
  • 基金资助:
    重庆市基础与前沿研究计划项目(cstc2020jcyj-msxmX0076);重庆市研究生导师团队建设项目(JDDSTD201802)

Study on Decision-making for Low-carbon Supply Chain with Capital Constraint and Risk Aversion

LI Li-ying, LIU Guang-an, LI Xiao-bing, WANG Bo   

  1. College of Mathematics and Statistics,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China
  • Online:2022-11-10 Published:2022-11-21
  • About author:LI Li-ying,born in 1975,Ph.D,asso-ciate professor.His main research inte-rests include logistics and supply chain management.
    LIU Guang-an,born in 1996,postgra-duate.His main research interests in-clude logistics and supply chain management.
  • Supported by:
    Basic and Advanced Research Project of Chongqing(cstc2020jcyjmsxmX0076) and Team Building Project for Graduate Tutors in Chongqing(JDDSTD201802).

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摘要： 为了缓解低碳环境下资金约束制造商融资难的问题,在“碳限额与交易”制度下,建立了由风险中性供应商主导、损失规避制造商跟随的 Stackelberg 博弈模型。假设在制造商的融资同时用于订购和减排投资决策的情形下,分别得出了风险中性和损失规避制造商的最优订购和减排决策,以及供应商的最优批发定价决策。理论和算例分析表明,制造商的损失规避度越高,制造商将采取更加保守的订购策略,这会促使供应商提高批发价格,从而使得制造商降低减排水平。制造商的损失规避性对自身期望效用的影响与政府分配的碳排放上限有关。当碳排放上限较大时,具有较高损失规避度的制造商可以在排放权交易市场出售更多剩余的排放许可量来获得额外的收益。

关键词: 碳限额, 碳排放权交易, 损失规避, 供应链融资

Abstract: In order to alleviate the financing difficulties of capital-constrained manufacturers in low-carbon environment,a Stac-kelberg game model is established in government’s cap-and-trade system,which is led by a risk-neutral supplier and followed by a loss-averse manufacturer.Based on the assumption that the manufacturer borrows two loans to execute the ordering decision and make emission reduction investment,the optimal ordering and emission reduction decisions of the risk-neutral and loss-averse manufacturer and the optimal wholesale pricing decision of the supplier are obtained,respectively.Theoretical and numerical ana-lysis show that when the manufacturer is loss-averse,it will make more conservative order decisions,and the supplier will set a higher wholesale price.As a result,the manufacturer reduces the emission reduction level.The impact of loss aversion on the expected utility of the manufacturer is related to carbon cap allocated by the government.When carbon cap is large,the manufactu-rer with higher loss aversion can earn additional gains by selling more remaining emission permits in the carbon permit trading markets.

Key words: Carbon emission quota, Carbon permit trade, Loss aversion, Supply chain finance

中图分类号: 

  • F274
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