计算机科学

计算机科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 50 ›› Issue (11A): 221200130-9.doi: 10.11896/jsjkx.221200130

• 交叉&应用 • 上一篇    下一篇

供需双方均受资金约束的低碳供应链决策研究

汪敏, 李莉英, 周俊   

  1. 重庆交通大学数学与统计学院 重庆 400074
  • 发布日期:2023-11-09
  • 通讯作者: 李莉英(llying-111@163.com)
  • 作者简介:(wangmin898@163.com)
  • 基金资助:
    重庆市研究生联合培养基地建设项目(JDLHPYJD2021016);重庆市高校创新研究群体项目(CXQT21021)

Study on Decision-making for a Low-carbon Supply Chain with Capital Constraint on Both Supply and Demand Sides

WANG Min, LI Liying, ZHOU Jun   

  1. College of Mathematics and Statistics,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China
  • Published:2023-11-09
  • About author:WANG Min,born in 1993,postgra-duate.Her main research interests include logistics and supply chain ma-nagement.
    LI Liying,born in 1975,Ph.D,associate professor.Her main research interests include logistics and supply chain ma-nagement.
  • Supported by:
    Joint Training Base Construction Project for Graduate Students in Chongqing(JDLHPYJD2021016) and Group Building Scientific Innovation Project for Universities in Chongqing(CXQT21021).

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摘要： 为了解决低碳环境下受资金约束的供需双方融资难的问题,在“碳限额与交易机制”下,构建了以银行为主领导者、供应商为次领导者和碳排放依赖型制造商为跟随者的双层Stackelberg博弈模型。在随机需求情形下,研究了供应商的最优批发价格决策、制造商的最优订购决策和减排决策,以及银行的最优利率决策。通过理论和算例分析表明:当政府分配的排放上限较低时,会增加制造商的破产风险,具有有限责任能力的制造商会采取更加冒进的订购策略;为减少借款方的破产风险带来的损失,银行会加强对整个供应链运作的监管;供应商的自由资金越多,对制造商和整体供应链的绩效越有利。

关键词: 碳限额, 低碳供应链, 资金约束, 随机需求, 双层Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: To alleviate the problem of financing difficulties for both the supply and demand sides with capital constraints under the low-carbon environment,a bi-level Stackelberg game model with the bank as the leader,the supplier as the subleader,and the carbon-dependent manufacturer as the follower,is formulated under the government’s “carbon cap-and-trade mechanism”.In the stochastic demand scenario,the supplier’s optimal wholesale price decision,the manufacturer’s optimal ordering and emission reduction decisions,and bank’s the optimal interest rate decision are investigated.Theoretical and numerical analyses show that,when the emission cap allocated by the government low,it will increase the bankruptcy risk of the manufacturer,and the manufacturer with limited liability will adopt a more aggressive ordering strategy.In order to reduce losses from the bankruptcy risk of borrowers,the bank will strengthen their regulation of the whole supply chain operation.The more free funds the supplier has,the more beneficial it is for the manufacturer and the overall supply chain performance.

Key words: Carbon emission quota, Low-carbon supply chain, Capital constraints, Demand stochastic, Bi-level Stackelberg game

中图分类号: 

  • F274
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