计算机科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 53 ›› Issue (10): 336-344.doi: 10.11896/jsjkx.260100120
贺祥, 徐汉川, 王甜甜, 王忠杰
HE Xiang, XU Hanchuan, WANG Tiantian, WANG Zhongjie
摘要: 开源软件已成为关键的数字公共基础设施,开源基金会则是支持其良性发展的治理主体。然而,基金会的制度设计需在相互冲突的目标间进行战略权衡。为此,构建了一个融合公共物品理论、委托代理理论与资源基础观的多维度分析框架;并在此基础上提出了一个核心的理论模型“开源治理三难困境”,即任何基金会都无法同时最大化战略方向、社区自治与生态中立。通过对3种典型治理模式(以Apache软件基金会为代表的“精英贤能共同体”、以云原生计算基金会为代表的“产业驱动平台整合者”以及以开放原子开源基金会为代表的“国家生态催化剂”)的深度案例比较,揭示了不同模式如何在该三难困境中进行取舍与平衡。研究发现,成功的开源治理是一个动态适应的过程,而非静态的结构选择。所提出的分析框架和三难困境模型,为理解和设计兼具韧性与全球影响力的开源生态系统提供了新的理论视角,并对中国开源基金会的未来发展路径具有重要的参考价值。
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