多智能代理决策交互的博弈问题研究

计算机科学 ›› 2013, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (7): 196-200.

多智能代理决策交互的博弈问题研究

徐朝辉,廉飞宇,付麦霞

武汉理工大学计算机学院武汉430070;河南工业大学信息科学与工程学院郑州450001;河南工业大学信息科学与工程学院郑州450001;河南工业大学信息科学与工程学院郑州450001

出版日期:2018-11-16 发布日期:2018-11-16
基金资助:
本文受国家自然科学基金项目(60673108)资助

Study on Game Theory in Decision Interaction for Multi Intelligent Agents Based on Information Fusion

XU Zhao-hui,LIAN Fei-yu and FU Mai-xia

Online:2018-11-16 Published:2018-11-16

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在高层的数据融合中,往往需要能够觉察和预测态势的变化趋势。因为由多个智能代理构成的交互系统,其态势的变化是靠各方的决策活动推动的,所以纯粹概率的或证据的技术对这类预测并不是充分有效的工具。对于这类预测任务,博弈论工具能够对其不确定的态势演变提供更好的判断与识别,而且博弈论还是一个行动规划工具。通过将关联图推理和博弈论相结合,提出了一种新的决策支持模型——Bayesian博弈模型,用于增强对由多个交互的智能代理形成的复杂局势的觉察和预测能力。通过一个实例,说明了决策者的博弈策略对态势评估的影响,并给出了实例的Bayesian博弈模型。提出的模型和方法克服了传统态势评估中忽略主观因素的缺陷,为具有博弈性质的态势评估提供了一种新的方法。

关键词: 多源信息融合,博弈论,策略组合,混合策略均衡,贝叶斯博弈中图法分类号TP311文献标识码A

Abstract: Variation tendency of situation needs to be perceived and predicted in a high level data fusion process．Because variation tendency of situation of a interaction system combined by multi intelligent agent is pushed forward by their respective decision process,pure probability and evidence theory are not satisfying available tools for this type of prediction．For these prediction,game theory can provide preferable decision and recognition,and is a tools of Process Planning．By combining influence diagrams with game theory,we proposed a new architecture—Bayesian Game Model for decision support to enhance capability of the awareness and prediction for a complex situation caused by multi interactive intelligent agents．Through a case,we explained the effect of the policymakers’ game strategies on situation assessment and gave the case’s Bayesian game model．The model and method proposed in the paper overcome the disadvantage of traditional method that neglects subjective factors,and might offer a new way to situation assessment with game feature.

Key words: Multisource information fusion,Game theory,Strategy profile,Mixed strategy equilibria,Bayesian game

徐朝辉,廉飞宇,付麦霞. 多智能代理决策交互的博弈问题研究[J]. 计算机科学, 2013, 40(7): 196-200. https://doi.org/

XU Zhao-hui,LIAN Fei-yu and FU Mai-xia. Study on Game Theory in Decision Interaction for Multi Intelligent Agents Based on Information Fusion[J]. Computer Science, 2013, 40(7): 196-200. https://doi.org/

参考文献

[1] 喻涛．网络中心战的发展动向与分析[J]．船舶电子工程,2012,32(8):17-20,3
[2] 贾华杰,鲜明,陈永光．网络中心战及其新技术[J]．国防科技,2011,2(4):44-49
[3] 郭锐,赵晓哲,伍方明．复杂军事决策综合集成研讨环境构建中若干问题探讨[J]．军事运筹与系统工程,2009,3(3):35-39
[4] 李小偎,王勇,潘泉,等．基于博弈论的C4ISR系统监视与侦察功能模型[J]．火力与指挥控制,2010,35(2):11-13
[5] 王从陆,尹长林．基于博弈论的安全决策信息融合[J]．中国安全科学学报,2005,15(4):74-76
[6] 王刚,赵海,魏守智．基于威胁博弈理论的决策级融合模型[J]．东北大学学报:自然科学版,2004,5(1):32-35
[7] 朱林,徐兴杰,张晓囡,等．改进的JDL信息融合系统功能模型研究[J]．计算机工程与科学,2007,9(2):122-124
[8] Murphy P K．Dynamic Bayesian Networks:Representation,Inference and Learning[D]．University of California,Berkeley,2002
[9] Suzi′c R．Representation and recognition of uncertain enemypolicies using statistical models[C]∥Proceedings of the NATO RTO Symposium on Military Data and Information Fusion．Prague,Czech Republic,Oct．2003
[10] Russell S J,Norvig P．Artifical Intelligence:A Modern Approach(2nd ed)[M]．Upper Saddle River,NJ:Prentice Hall,2003
[11] Cowell R G,Dawid A P,Lauritzen S L,et al.Probabilistic Networks and Expert Systems[M]．Statistics for Engineering and Information Science,New York:Springer-Verlag,1999
[12] Wallenius K．Support for situation awareness in command and control[C]∥Svensson P,Schubert J,eds.Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Information Fusion (FUSION 2004)．Stockholm,Sweden,vol．2,2004:1117-1124
[13] Johansson R,Xiong N,Christensen H I．A game theoretic model for management of mobile sensors[C]∥Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Information Fusion (FUSION 2003)．Cairns,Australia,July 2003:583-590
[14] Xiong N,Svensson P．Multi-sensor management for information fusion:Issues and approaches[J]．Information Fusion,2002,3(2):163-186
[15] Azoulay-Schwartz R,Kraus S．Negotiation on data allocation in multi-agent environments[J]．Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems,2002,5(2):123-172
[16] Cottle R W,Pang J-S,Stone R E．The Linear Complementarity Problem[M]．Boston,MA:Academic Press,1992
[17] Myerson R B．Game Theory:Analysis of Conflict[M]．Cam-bridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1991
[18] Harsanyi J C．Games with incomplete information played by“Bayesian” players[J]．Management Science,1967,14(3)
[19] von Stengel B．Computing equilibria for two-person games[M]∥Aumann R J,Hart S,eds.Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,Elsevier Science,vol．3of Handbooks in Economics,2002:1723-1759
[20] Gilboa I,Zemel E．Nash and correlated equilibria:Some com-plexity considerations[J]．Games and Economic Behavior,1989,1(1):80-93
[21] Brynielsson J,Arnborg S．Refinements of the command and control game component[C]∥Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Information Fusion (FUSION 2005)．Philadelphia,PA,July 2005

Metrics

Viewed

Full text

Abstract

Cited

Shared

Discussed