Computer Science ›› 2022, Vol. 49 ›› Issue (11A): 210900104-6.doi: 10.11896/jsjkx.210900104

• Interdiscipline & Application • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Study on Decision-making for Low-carbon Supply Chain with Capital Constraint and Risk Aversion

LI Li-ying, LIU Guang-an, LI Xiao-bing, WANG Bo   

  1. College of Mathematics and Statistics,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China
  • Online:2022-11-10 Published:2022-11-21
  • About author:LI Li-ying,born in 1975,Ph.D,asso-ciate professor.His main research inte-rests include logistics and supply chain management.
    LIU Guang-an,born in 1996,postgra-duate.His main research interests in-clude logistics and supply chain management.
  • Supported by:
    Basic and Advanced Research Project of Chongqing(cstc2020jcyjmsxmX0076) and Team Building Project for Graduate Tutors in Chongqing(JDDSTD201802).

Abstract: In order to alleviate the financing difficulties of capital-constrained manufacturers in low-carbon environment,a Stac-kelberg game model is established in government’s cap-and-trade system,which is led by a risk-neutral supplier and followed by a loss-averse manufacturer.Based on the assumption that the manufacturer borrows two loans to execute the ordering decision and make emission reduction investment,the optimal ordering and emission reduction decisions of the risk-neutral and loss-averse manufacturer and the optimal wholesale pricing decision of the supplier are obtained,respectively.Theoretical and numerical ana-lysis show that when the manufacturer is loss-averse,it will make more conservative order decisions,and the supplier will set a higher wholesale price.As a result,the manufacturer reduces the emission reduction level.The impact of loss aversion on the expected utility of the manufacturer is related to carbon cap allocated by the government.When carbon cap is large,the manufactu-rer with higher loss aversion can earn additional gains by selling more remaining emission permits in the carbon permit trading markets.

Key words: Carbon emission quota, Carbon permit trade, Loss aversion, Supply chain finance

CLC Number: 

  • F274
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