Computer Science ›› 2017, Vol. 44 ›› Issue (5): 153-159.doi: 10.11896/j.issn.1002-137X.2017.05.027
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GONG Xu-fu, WEI Cheng-jian, QIAN Zhen, CHE Bao-zhen and SHEN Hang
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