计算机科学

计算机科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 49 ›› Issue (6A): 744-752.doi: 10.11896/jsjkx.211000055

• 交叉&应用 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑信息泄露和信息投资成本因素下平台的信息共享及渠道策略研究

徐明月   

  1. 青岛大学商学院 山东 青岛 266071
  • 出版日期:2022-06-10 发布日期:2022-06-08
  • 通讯作者: 徐明月(17854274712@163.com)
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金(11401331);教育部人文社科基金(18YJC630119);山东省自然科学基金(ZR2020MA024);山东省社科规划项目(20CSDJ16)

Study on Information Sharing and Channel Strategy of Platform in Consideration ofInformation Leakage and Information Investing Cost

XU Ming-yue   

  1. School of Business,Qingdao University,Qingdao,Shandong 266071,China
  • Online:2022-06-10 Published:2022-06-08
  • About author:XU Ming-yue,born in 1997,postgra-duate.Her main research interests include supply chain management and so on.
  • Supported by:
    National Natural Science Fundation of China(11401331),Ministry of Education of Humanities and Social Science Project(18YJC630119),Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province,China(ZR2020MA024) and Social Science Planning Fund Program of Shandong Province(20CSDJ16).

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摘要： 构建了由制造商、电商平台和传统线下零售商组成的供应链,其中电商平台选择线上销售模式并制定信息分享策略。针对线上转售模式和线上代理模式下电商平台信息分享和不分享的情形,基于贝叶斯博弈和信息泄露效应,探究了在需求预测需要投资和信息分享策略的共同作用下,双渠道供应链中电商平台的销售模式选择。研究发现:除非需求不确定性低且平台收入分享比例高,否则电商平台选择转售模式。电商平台信息分享策略与线上销售模式和需求不确定程度有关。转售电商平台总是没有动机的自愿地和制造商分享信息;当需求不确定性较高时,代理电商平台自愿和制造商分享信息。进一步的研究发现,在代理模式中,信息分享对所有供应链成员都有利;在转售模式中,信息分享可能会对供应链不利,只有在需求不确定性较高且渠道竞争程度较低时,信息分享才能提高供应链的整体绩效。

关键词: 贝叶斯博弈, 电商平台, 信息分享, 信息泄露

Abstract: A model in which a manufacturer sells products through an e-commerce platform and a traditional offline retailer is constructed.Specifically,the e-commerce platform selects online selling format and establishes information sharing strategy.This paper compares and analyses four situations where the online selling format is either reselling or agency selling with or without information sharing.Based on Bayesian game and information leakage effect,what is the e-commerce platform's choice,agency selling or reselling with the interaction of information investing cost and sharing strategy in dual-channel supply chain.Research shows that,firstly,unless the demand uncertainty is low and the platform revenue sharing ratio is high,the e-commerce platform selects the reselling format.Secondly,the e-commerce platform's incentive to share information strongly depends on its online selling format selection and demand uncertain degree.Under reselling case,the e-commerce platform does not share information voluntarily.While under agency selling case,the e-commerce platform shares information with manufacturer voluntarily when the demand uncertainty is high.Finally,under agency selling case,information sharing is beneficial for all members of supply chain.More specially,information sharing is not always beneficial for the entire dual-supply chain under reselling case.Only if the demand uncertainty is high and the cross-channel substitutability is small,information sharing can improve the performance of entire supply chain.

Key words: Bayesian game, E-commerce platform, Information leakage, Information sharing

中图分类号: 

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