计算机科学 ›› 2011, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (12): 53-56.

• 计算机网络与信息安全 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于汉明重的PRESENT密码代数旁路攻击

吴克辉,王韬,赵新杰,刘会英   

  1. (军械工程学院计算机工程系 石家庄050003)
  • 出版日期:2018-12-01 发布日期:2018-12-01

Hamming Weight-based Algebraic Side-channel Attack against PRESENT

  • Online:2018-12-01 Published:2018-12-01

摘要: 研究了分组密码代数旁路攻击原理及模型、非线性布尔方程组转化为saT问题的方法,提出了一种基于汉明重的PRESENT密码代数旁路攻击方法,降低了求解非线性多元方程组的复杂度,减少了旁路攻击所需样本量,并通过实验对理论正确性进行了验证。结果表明,在已知明文条件下,利用一个样本前3轮的S盒输入、输出汉明重在0.63s内即可恢复80bit PRESENT完整密钥;在未知明密文和S盒输入、输出汉明重随机选取条件下,也可恢复PRESENT完整密钥。

关键词: 代数旁路攻击,代数攻击,旁路攻击,汉明重,PRESENT

Abstract: This paper examined the theory and model of algebraic sidcchanncl attack against block ciphers, the method of converting non-linear boolean equation system to SAT problem, proposed a method of Hamming weight based algebraic sid}channel cryptanalysis against PRESENT, reduced the complexity of solving non-linear boolean ectuation system and the sample size of sidcchanncl attack,finally testified the validity of theory through experiments. Results show that if knowing one sample of plaintext, it can recover 80 bit keys of PRESENT with Hamming weights of S-box inputs and outputs of front 10 round in 0. 63 seconds; if plaintext and cipher are unknow or the used Hamming weights of Sbox input arc random, it can also make a success of recovering complete PRESENT key.

Key words: Algebraic side-channel attack, Algebraic attacks, Side-channel attack, Hamming weight, PRESENT

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