Computer Science ›› 2018, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (4): 25-33.doi: 10.11896/j.issn.1002-137X.2018.04.004

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Summary of Security Technology and Application in Industrial Control System

SUO Yan-feng, WANG Shao-jie, QIN Yu, LI Qiu-xiang, FENG Da-jun and LI Jing-chun   

  • Online:2018-04-15 Published:2018-05-11

Abstract: In order to face the new challenges caused by the deep integration of control system and Internet technology and resist the target attack,such as shock virus,flame virus and BlackEnergy,aiming at the technical lag of industrial control system vulnerability mining,repair and control,and the problems of “difficult to detect,difficult to monitor,difficult to protect”,this paper researched the theoretical model,key technology,equipment development and test evaluation of industrial control system.Besides,through taking the research of vulnerability mining and utilization as the main line,taking theoretical system architecture research and test verification platform construction as the basis,taking dynamically monitoring protection and active defense as the goal,taking test example set attack and defense verification and typical demonstration as the applicationl,this paper proposed security technology solutions including industrial control system vulnerability mining,depth detection,dynamic protection,active defense,and designed the integrated security technology system including vulnerability mining,verification and evaluation,dynamic protection and active defense.

Key words: Industrial control system,Vulnerability mining,Validation evaluation,Dynamic protection,Active defense

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