计算机科学 ›› 2025, Vol. 52 ›› Issue (8): 17-28.doi: 10.11896/jsjkx.250400023

• 学科前沿 • 上一篇    下一篇

数据市场制度建设的理论建模和动态分析

商希雪1, 韩海庭2, 朱郑州3, 屈秀伟3   

  1. 1 中国政法大学刑事司法学院 北京 100088
    2 哥本哈根大学理学院 哥本哈根 FC1958
    3 北京大学软件与微电子学院 北京 100871
  • 收稿日期:2025-04-07 修回日期:2025-06-13 出版日期:2025-08-15 发布日期:2025-08-08
  • 通讯作者: 屈秀伟(h.han@insscd.org)
  • 作者简介:(shangxixue@126.com)
  • 基金资助:
    中国政法大学青年教师学术创新团队支持计划“联合国打击网络犯罪公约刑事一体化研究”(25CXTD09)

Theoretical Modeling and Dynamic Analysis of Institutional Construction in Data Markets

SHANG Xixue1, HAN Haiting2, ZHU Zhengzhou3, QU Xiuwei3   

  1. 1 School of Criminal Justice,China University of Political Science and Law,Beijing 100088,China
    2 School of Science,University of Copenhagen,Copenhagen FC1958,Denmark
    3 School of Software and Microelectronic,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China
  • Received:2025-04-07 Revised:2025-06-13 Online:2025-08-15 Published:2025-08-08
  • About author:SHANG Xixue,born in 1987,Ph.D,associate professor.Her main research interests include legal protection for personal data and regulation approach to digital economy.
    QU Xiuwei,born in 1989,master,engineer.His main research interests include data governance and data marketplace.
  • Supported by:
    Program for Young Innovative Research Team in China University of Political Science and Law Under the Project “United Nations Convention on Cybercrime:Integrated Criminal Research”(25CXTD09).

摘要: 在人工智能等技术涌现和飞速发展的新时期,数据已成为企业和社会的核心资产,但数据市场治理始终面临经济激励不足、科学量化评估难和隐蔽性侵权多等挑战。对此,基于演化博弈理论构建了包括数据提供方、需求方和监管平台在内的三方博弈框架。通过分析企业数据开发能力、公共监管强度,以及参与者不同策略选择等对数据市场演化的动态影响发现:提高企业数据开发能力是激活市场活力、提高社会福利的根本办法,也是导致企业违规行为的诱因之一;公共监管强度的增加可以规范市场秩序,但也可能会抑制部分企业的创新实践。通过理论求解和数值仿真,不仅揭示了监管效力、开发能力等要素的非线性特征,也为科学量化执法的实现提供了重要依据。通过“激励-约束-补偿”三位一体的动态监管机制和分析模型,可以有效预测市场演化特征,结合市场短期、中期和长期发展目标,改变“激励-约束-补偿”相关参数设定,使政策制定更科学,政策强度更精确。

关键词: 数据治理, 机制设计, 演化博弈, 数据市场

Abstract: In the new era marked by the emergence and rapid development of technologies like artificial intelligence,data has become a core asset for enterprises and society.However,data market governance continues to face challenges such as insufficient economic incentives,difficulties in scientific quantification and evaluation,and prevalent covert infringements.Based on evolutio-nary game theory,this study constructs a tripartite game framework encompassing data providers,demanders,and regulatory platforms.Through the dynamic impact of factors including enterprise data development capabilities,public regulatory intensity,and participants'strategic choices on the evolution of data markets,it finds that enhancing enterprise data development capabilities is fundamental to activating market vitality and improving social welfare,yet it is also one of the catalysts for corporate violations,increasing public regulatory intensity can standardize market order but may simultaneously suppress innovative practices among certain enterprises.Through theoretical solutions and numerical simulations,the study not only reveals the nonlinear characteristics of factors such as regulatory efficacy and development capabilities,but also provides a critical basis for achieving scientifically quantifiable law enforcement.By implementing a dynamic regulatory mechanism and analytical model featuring a “incentive-constraint-compensation” trinity approach,market evolution patterns can be effectively predicted.Aligning with short-,medium-,and long-term market development goals,adjusting parameter settings within this “incentive-constraint-compensation” framework will enhance the scientific rigor of policy formulation and the precision of policy intensity.

Key words: Data governance, Mechanism design, Evolutionary game, Data markets

中图分类号: 

  • TP301.6
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