Computer Science ›› 2022, Vol. 49 ›› Issue (11A): 211100111-5.doi: 10.11896/jsjkx.211100111

• Information Security • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Study on Formal Verification of EAP-TLS Protocol

CHEN Li-ping1,2, XU Peng1,2, WANG Dan-chen2,3, XU Yang1,2   

  1. 1 School of Mathematics,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 611756,China
    2 National-local Joint Engineering Lab of System Credibility Automatic Verification,Chengdu 611756,China
    3 Sichuan Provinical Digital Economy Research Center,Chengdu 610021,China
  • Online:2022-11-10 Published:2022-11-21
  • About author:CHEN Li-ping,born in 1997,postgraduate.Her main research interests include formal verification of security protocols and so on.
    XU Peng,born in 1981,Ph.D,lecturer.His main research interests include cyberspace security,formal verification,spectrum and electromagnetic environment management.
  • Supported by:
    National Natural Science Foundation of China(61976130),Sichuan Province Science and Technology Planning Project(2020YJ0270),Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(2682021GF012) and Scientific Research Plan of Sichuan Radio Monitoring Station([2019]4).

Abstract: EAP-TLS is a security protocol defined under the 5G standard that provides key services in a specific IoT environment.However,the EAP-TLS protocol cannot provide mutual authentication between user equipment and the network.A protocol with design flaws will endanger the security of the system during operation.Therefore,it is a very necessary process to analyze its security before the implementation of the protocol,try to find potential flaws and improve them.This paper studies theformal model of EAP-TLS protocol and security properties based on Proverif,and verifies the security properties such as the mutual authentication between user equipment and network,confidentiality between KSEAF(security anchor key) and subscriber permanent identity(SUPI).Verification results find that there are some security flaws in the EAP-TLS protocol in terms of authentication under insecure channels,and the user equipment fails to authenticate the network.Analytical results further confirm the reasons of security flaws,and the corresponding attacks are also given.Finally,the possibility of improving security flaws is discussed based on asymmetric key encryption and random numbers in cryptography.

Key words: Authentication protocol, EAP-TLS, Formal verification, Proverif, Insecure channel

CLC Number: 

  • TN915.04
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